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ABSTRACT
The present study aimed to document the effects of financial constraints on the negative relationship between cash flow and external funds, 
a phenomenon associated with the Pecking Order Theory. This theory suggests that companies subject to more expensive external funds 
(financially constrained firms) should demonstrate a stronger negative relationship with cash flow than companies subject to minor financial 
frictions (financially unconstrained firms). The results indicate that the external funds of constrained firms consistently present less negative 
sensitivity to cash flow compared with those of unconstrained companies. Additionally, the internal funds of constrained companies demonstrate 
a positive sensitivity to cash flow, whereas those of unconstrained companies do not show any such significant behavior. These results are in 
accordance with the findings of Almeida and Campello (2010), who suggest the following: first, because of the endogenous nature of investment 
decisions in constrained companies, the complementary relationship between internal and external funds prevails over the substitutive effects 
suggested by the Pecking Order Theory; and second, the negative relationship between cash flow and external funds cannot be interpreted as 
evidence of costly external funds and therefore does not corroborate the Pecking Order Theory.
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 1  IntroductIon
The literature on capital structure has treated in-
vestments as exogenous to financial policies (Fama and 
French, 2002; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Howe-
ver, extensive studies on financial constraints (Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Hubbard, 1998; Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach, 2004) have presented evidence 
that because of financial frictions, not all companies can 
fully finance their investment opportunities. As a result, 
some companies experience financial constraints. In 
this state, investment decisions become endogenous to 
financial policies.
Few studies have attempted to reconcile these two 
views from the literature with regard to financing-in-
vestment interactions. Almeida and Campello (2010) 
attempt to do so in a study re-interpreting capital struc-
ture, which is a consolidated fact in the literature, in 
the light of the Pecking Order Theory. Specifically, the 
authors find that there is a negative relationship betwe-
en the generation of internal funds and the demand for 
external financing. The authors present evidence that a 
reduction in the demand for external funds is less sen-
sitive to the internal generation of funds in constrained 
companies (i.e., is subject to greater financial frictions). 
This finding contradicts the Pecking Order Theory and 
suggests that this behavior is associated with the comple-
mentarity between external and internal funds because 
of the effect of endogenous investment.
Prior evidence suggests that the individual charac-
teristics of each company affect the company’s ability 
to raise external funds and that environmental varia-
bles exert a moderating effect. Institutional charac-
teristics shape the orientation of the financial system 
and companies because countries with weak protection 
for investors and lenders tend to have less developed 
capital markets, and companies, which are ownership 
structures that primarily serve as a substitute for legal 
protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998, 1999), tend to raise transaction and capi-
tal costs and limit access to external financing sources 
by increasing incentives to maintain liquidity (Diit-
tmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003; Kalcheva and 
Lins, 2007; Baum, Shäfer and Talavera, 2009; Khurana, 
Martin and Pereira, 2006).
The present study sought to question whether the 
behavior of Brazilian companies fits the arguments and 
the USA-derived evidence of Almeida and Campello 
(2010). In other words, the study aimed to evaluate em-
pirically whether the relationship between the genera-
tion of internal funds and the demand for external funds 
is more negative for financially unconstrained firms than 
for constrained firms and whether such behavior is asso-
ciated with the endogenous nature of investments under 
financial constraints. This study is relevant to Brazilian 
companies in several ways. First, the evidence suggests 
that environmental differences determine the behavior 
of companies while changing the funding structures 
and the degree of financial friction, which may involve 
a change in the substitutive/complementary relationship 
between external and internal funds. Second, Bekaert 
and Harvey’s (2002) arguments about the need to deve-
lop research in emerging markets present theoretical and 
empirical challenges. Third, the environmental differen-
ces (La Porta et al., 1998) between Brazil and the United 
States are reflected in the companies’ cash (Koshio and 
Cia, 2004) and debt policies (Leal, 2008).
The gap addressed in the present study shows the 
need to reconcile capital structure theories with the en-
dogenous investment implications arising from finan-
cial constraints in emerging economies such as Brazil. 
The results obtained here indicate the need for a review 
of significant national data that support the research on 
capital structures.
The present study is structured as follows: section 
2 presents the literature review; section 3 presents the 
methodological aspects; section 4 analyzes the results 
of empirical testing; and section 5 presents the final 
considerations.
 2  LIterature revIew
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that the value 
of a company is independent from the form in which 
it is financed. Therefore, the separation theorem is va-
lid (i.e., in a friction-free environment, companies can 
fully finance their investment opportunities to create 
value without depending on financing decisions). The-
oretical studies have questioned the validity of these 
propositions in the presence of market friction, such as 
asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These 
frictions can generate anything from an increase in the 
cost of external funds for internally generated funds to 
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Under these 
conditions, companies are characterized as financially 
constrained in that they make suboptimal investment 
decisions because of their insufficient internal and ex-
ternal sources of financing. Thus, these companies un-
derinvest and incur a reduction in value.
The study by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
is a milestone in the literature on the relations of the 
cost differential between internal and external sources 
of financing and their effects on companies' investment 
policies. These authors find evidence that the invest-
ment decisions of companies depend not only on the 
net present value (NPV) of projects but also on the va-
riation in the availability of internal resources, accor-
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ding to the degree of financial constraint. The authors’ 
largest empirical contribution is to examine the in-
fluence of financial frictions on corporate investment 
by empirically comparing investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity among groups of companies subject to varying 
degrees of financial friction (and hence to varying de-
grees of financial constraint).
However, some authors, such as Erickson and Whi-
ted (2000), have questioned Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen’s (1988) empirical strategy, which focuses 
mainly on the potentially informative content of cash 
flow on investment opportunities. The study by Almei-
da, Campello and Weisbach (2004) responds to such 
criticism. Their work not only proposes a new empiri-
cal strategy but also enables the relationship between 
financial constraints, financial policies and investment 
to be extended in light of the companies' cash policies. 
This extension follows from the assumption that if com-
panies face a costly financing source, they modify their 
current financial policies by increasing their cash vo-
lume to enable more valuable future investments. The 
trade-off from the costs and benefits of the inter-tem-
poral adjustments of liquidity prioritization generates 
the empirical implication that constrained companies 
should demonstrate a systematic and positive sensitivi-
ty to cash flow. In contrast, unconstrained companies 
should not present this systematic behavior.
However, the literature on capital structure has ne-
glected to address the effects of financial constraints on 
the interaction between financing and investment, despi-
te the theoretical arguments and evidence regarding this 
subject (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach, 2004; Baum, Shäfer and Tavalera, 
2009; Khurana, Martin and Pereira, 2006; Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006). Almeida and Campello’s (2010) study helps 
to address this gap, particularly with regard to the Pecking 
Order Theory.
The Pecking Order Theory suggests that in the face 
of high external financing costs, companies should 
prefer to finance their investments with internal fun-
ds because of information asymmetry. This prefe-
rence causes the companies subject to costly external 
funds to present a negative ratio of the generation of 
internal funds (cash flow) to the demand for external 
funds (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Empi-
rical studies in Brazil have documented this negative 
relationship and have suggested a behavioral element 
of the Pecking Order Theory (Bastos, Nakamura and 
Basso, 2009; Medeiros and Daher, 2008; Nakamura et 
al., 2007).
Thus, if the negative relationship between cash flow 
and the demand for external funds is due to the cost of 
external financing, companies subject to costly exter-
nal funds must present a stronger negative relationship 
than companies not subject to financial frictions. Ho-
wever, Almeida and Campello (2010) present robust 
evidence suggesting that this negative relationship 
is stronger in those companies less likely to be under 
strong financial frictions (financially unconstrained 
firms). Thus, contrary to the viewpoint established in 
the literature, these findings cannot be interpreted as 
evidence for external financing costs arising from in-
formation asymmetry.
Almeida and Campello (2010) suggest that the en-
dogenous effects of investment on external financing 
decisions may explain this behavior. The pecking order 
argument ignores the possibility that investment deci-
sions become endogenous because internal funds are 
insufficient to finance them and the cost of external 
funds is prohibitively high. The endogeneity of invest-
ment presents three fundamental soothing effects of 
the substitutivity between external and internal funds 
in constrained companies.
First, constrained companies face sub-investments 
and subject the decision to use internal funds to a 
trade-off between the reduction in their exposure to 
external funds and the increase in their current invest-
ments. Given the high cost of investment opportuni-
ties, constrained companies would find it relatively 
more advantageous to direct more internal funds to-
ward their current investments.
Second, constrained companies adjust their current 
financial policies to mitigate the adverse effects of fi-
nancial constraints on both current and future invest-
ments. Constrained companies adjust to ensure that 
sufficient funds are available to meet their investment 
opportunities by targeting the generation of internal 
funds (cash flow) to increase the available volume of 
liquid assets (internal funds) as cash and short-term 
investments (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004) 
and working capital (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993) while 
directing less internal funds towards the reduction of 
external funds.
Third, constrained companies’ internal funds and 
capacity to raise external funds are complementary be-
cause of the credit multiplier effect. As the company’s 
cash flow and other internal funds are directed to colla-
teralizable assets, new external funds are raised in turn. 
When applied in new collateralizable assets (i.e., physi-
cal and liquid assets that can be used as security), these 
new external funds establish a systematic behavior that 
amplifies the positive effect of internal funds on the ca-
pacity to raise external funds (Almeida and Campello, 
2007) by reducing the costs of external funds (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989) and increasing their collateral value 
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
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1 Auxiliary tests: diagnosis of multicollinearity using the correlation matrix of the variables for each group and variance inflation factor (VIF); heteroscedasticity diagnostics using modified Wald statistics for fixed 
effects-OLS and Pagan-Hall for fixed effects-IV; and use of the Baltagi-Wu autocorrelation test and Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan’s test, which is appropriate for fixed effects. The estimates are robust 
to section 4 heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using the Eiker-Huber-White variance estimator.
2 Corresponds to Availability and Short-Term Investments in the Economática Database.
3 The final decision to consider an endogenous variable depended on the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. The two-step GMM was operated by the xtivreg2 command in the Stata software v. 11.
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 3  MethodoLogIcaL Procedures
To document how the relationship between external 
and internal funds is affected by financial constraints, 
we followed three steps: 1) define the empirical tests1 to 
be used; 2) define the classification criteria of the com-
panies a priori according to their financial state (cons-
trained or unconstrained); and 3) define the sample, the 
procedures for collecting and processing the data and 
the sampling restrictions.
 3.1  empirical tests
The first test aimed to verify whether the classification 
criteria selected to separate financially constrained and 
unconstrained companies were consistent. Following the 
approach suggested by Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004), we expected constrained companies to have a signi-
ficant and positive sensitivity to cash flow and unconstrai-
ned companies to show no such significant behavior. The 
following model estimated by least squares in two stages 
(LS2S) was adopted, with fixed effects for company and 
year (Model 1):
ΔRCi,t = β0 + β1CFi,t + β2Qi,t + β3Ln(TA)i,t+ β4Δ (CA-C)i,t  
                  + β5STDi,t+ β6PAAi,t +  ei,t'   1
where ∆CR was defined as the annual change in 
the sum of cash and short-term financial investments2. 
Cash flow (CF) is defined as net income plus deprecia-
tion and minus dividends and interest on the company’s 
own capital. The size Ln (TA) was defined as the ne-
perian logarithm of the book value of the company's 
assets for the period. Including the size allows us to 
control for the effects of transaction costs and econo-
mies that affect cash and debt policy decisions. As a 
proxy for investment opportunity, we used Tobin’s Q, 
measured as total assets – equity + market value of sha-
res / total assets.
The following additional variables were used as con-
trols for substitutes and cash flow: ∆CA-C, the sum of the 
change in current assets minus the change in cash reser-
ves (CR); ∆STD, the variation in the short-term financial 
debt (bonds and financing); and applications in permanent 
assets (PAA), including affiliated companies and subsidia-
ries. All of the variables except Ln (TA) were divided by 
the total assets. To recognize a possible endogeneity of the 
variables, we used a two-year gap of endogenous variables 
as the instrument.
The second test aimed to verify whether investment en-
dogeneity mitigates the substitutive relationship between 
external and internal funds, which would imply that exter-
nal funds (debt and equity) are more sensitive to reduced 
cash flow for constrained companies than for unconstrai-
ned companies. The model used two alternative specifica-
tions for the sensitivity of external funds to cash flow. The 
first specification, estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) with fixed effects for company and year (Model 2), 
only includes proxies for the variables that are believed to 
capture primary information related to the theory: cash 
flow, investment opportunities and size. This model was 
calculated as:
ΔFEi,t = α1CFi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Ln(TA)i,t+ Σ companyi  
                  + Σ yeart +  ei,t'   2
where (∆EF) is defined as the change in external 
sources of financing and the proxy is measured as the 
sum of the net issuance of debt (annual change of the 
debentures and short-term and long-term financing) 
and net emission of shares (NES), measured as the an-
nual change of stockholders' equity minus the retained 
profits. Cash flow is defined as the net income plus de-
preciation and amortization. These variables were divi-
ded by the total assets.
The second specification for the sensitivity of ex-
ternal financing considers the effects of pre-existing 
balances (one year lag) in the internal funds, the initial 
capital structure and the collateralizable assets on the 
debt policy. To control the pre-existing internal funds, 
we adopted the cash reserve (CR) and the sum of the 
client accounts and stocks, defined as other liquid assets 
(OLA). As tangible/collateralizable assets, we used the 
balance in fixed assets (FA) and measured the initial ca-
pital structure as the ratio of debt to equity (Debt/Eq). 
These variables were divided by the total assets, with the 
exception of Debt/Eq. The model was estimated by the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in two steps, 
with fixed effects for company and year. The model was 
specified as follows:
ΔFEi,t = α1CFi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Ln(TA)i,t+ α4CRi,t-1 + α5OLAi,t-1  
                  + α6FAi,t-1+ α7 Debt/EQt-1 +Σi company+Σt year +  εi,t,  3
where FA and Debt/Eq were considered to be endoge-
nous variables. Two lags of the endogenous variables were 
used as instruments3.
The third test was intended to show that the in-
ternal and external funds in constrained companies 
exhibited greater complementarity than the funds of 
unconstrained companies. Empirically, we hoped that 
compared with the unconstrained companies’ funds, 
the constrained companies’ external funds and internal 
funds would demonstrate less negative sensitivity and 
greater positive sensitivity to cash flow, respectively. 
The behavior was noted by contrasting the sensitivity 
of the constrained and unconstrained companies’ in-
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4 The law 6404/76 and the more recent law 10303/01 predict that if the status is omitted and the General Assembly considers changing it to introduce a standard on the dividend policy, the mandatory dividend 
may not be less than 25% of the adjusted net income. Therefore, the companies with zero payouts may be separated because, otherwise, some companies with this characteristic or with less than 0.25 payouts 
could be classified as unconstrained. No company classified as unrestricted presented a total payout of less than 25%. Additionally, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 indicate that the criteria adopted are 
capable of discriminating between the companies in those two states.
ternal and external funds to their cash flows. We used 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with fixed 
effects for company and year to capture this concurrent 
behavior between the policies from the same company 
(Models 4 and 5):
ΔFEi,t = α1FCi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Sizei,t+ Σ companyi  
                  + Σ year +  ei,t   4
ΔFIi,t = β1FCi,t + β2Qi,t + β3Sizei,t+ Σ companyi  
                  + Σ yeart +  ei,t,   5
where ∆IF captures the variation in internal funds. In 
this study, the proxy was measured as the variance of the 
sum of the CR and OLA. These variables were divided by 
the total assets.
We ran Models 3 and 4 to verify the sensitivity of the 
external funds and to detect the isolated debt sensitivity. 
The objective was to identify the possible differences in 
behavior due to the source of external funds and to avoid 
potential problems with measuring the proxy for net share 
issuance.
 3.2  classification method a priori regarding the 
financial state
Considering the criteria used in previous studies and 
the local characteristics and limitations of publicly availa-
ble data, we proposed the following criteria for classifying 
the companies’ financial constraints: total payout (PAY); 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR) issuance; and the 
intersection between the Size and Total Payout criteria 
(SIZE∩PAY). For the 1995-2005 period, the companies 
were ranked annually according to these criteria.
3.2.1 classification based on total Payout (PaY)
PAY is defined as the sum of dividends and interest on 
the company’s own capital divided by its net profit. The com-
panies that did not pay annual dividends4 or interest on capi-
tal and that did not make any repurchases were classified as 
financially restricted. Among the companies that submitted 
a PAY greater than zero, the companies of the lower three 
deciles of the distribution were considered financially cons-
trained companies, whereas the companies of the top three 
deciles were classified as financially unconstrained.
This classification is justified by Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen’s (1988) argument because the conditioning from 
the payment of dividends is supported by the effects of 
asymmetric information on the differential of the costs and 
limits of internal and external funds. According to Myers 
and Majluf (1984), this differential justifies the existence of 
financial clearance and the preference for internally gene-
rated funds, which creates a hierarchy of financing sources. 
In this situation, not paying or reducing dividends would 
benefit shareholders because these resources can be applied 
in investment opportunities with positive NPV, which 
otherwise could not be financed because of the depletion 
of other internal funds.
Other evidence from prior studies strengthens this ar-
gument. Fama and French (2002) suggest that the lowest 
dividend payment can be associated with difficulties in ac-
cessing external sources of financing. In Brazil, a negative 
relationship has been found between growth opportunities 
and payout (Futema, Basso and Kayo, 2009; Iquiapaza, 
Amaral and Lamounier, 2008).
3.2.2 adr issuers (adr)
The companies were classified annually based on the 
condition that they are broadcasting American Deposi-
tary Receipts (ADR) of levels 2 and 3. The companies is-
suing ADRs were considered financially unconstrained, 
whereas those that did not present ADRs annually were 
considered financially constrained. Unlike Brazilian stu-
dies, studies in the USA do not adopt this criterion. Ho-
wever, according to Bruni (2002), this criterion can be 
used to identify companies that are subject to major in-
formational requirements by the Securities and Exchan-
ge Commission (SEC) and subject to the lower costs of 
capital and limitations to local offers of external funds. 
In Brazil, Costa, Paz and Funchal (2008) find evidence 
consistent with the findings of Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) by using the ADR issuance as a classi-
fication criterion.
3.2.3 Intersection between the criteria of size and 
total Payout (sIZe ∩ PaY)
We used the intersection between the observations 
of the companies classified according to the criteria of 
Size and Total Payout. In other words, only the compa-
nies that presented the same state in both criteria were 
classified as constrained or unconstrained. The goal of 
this classification scheme was to promote more restric-
tive conditions among classifications because the Bra-
zilian studies (e.g., Costa and Paz, 2004) that applied 
the two criteria separately have failed to achieve the 
theoretical results.
Using the criterion Size, we classified the companies 
for each year by using the total asset proxy. The compa-
nies in the three lower deciles of the distribution of total 
asset size were considered financially constrained, and 
those in the three higher deciles were considered finan-
cially unconstrained.
The use of the Size criterion is justified by the evi-
dence showing that the size of the company is associated 
with the degree of friction to which it is exposed (Fama 
and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Faulkender’s 
(2002) findings suggest that smaller companies are sub-
ject to greater informational asymmetry and high tran-
saction costs. Additionally, these companies do not be-
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 Table 1  Descriptive statistics of the sample and groups
Variables
Complete 
Sample
ADR PAY SIZE∩PAY
C U C ≠U C U C ≠U C U C ≠U
M/(SD) M/(SD) M/(SD) PV M/(SD) M/(SD) PV M/(SD) M/(SD) PV
ΔEF
0,0321 0,0307 0,0453
0,200
0,0344 0,0277
0,454
0,0273 0,0324
0,679
(0,144) (0,145) (0,137) (0,160) (0,127) (0,155) (0,133)
ΔDebt
0,0022 0,0007 0,0158
0,090
-0,0055 0,0095
0,031
-0,0150 0,0138
0,002
(0,114) (0,114) (0,112) (0,127) (0,098) (0,121) (0,086)
NES
0,0302 0,0302 0,0300
0,976
0,0401 0,0189
0,000
0,0424 0,0210
0,037
(0,100) (0,101) (0,092) (0,118) (0,078) (0,136) (0,074)
CF
0,0612 0,0562 0,1063
0,000
0,0247 0,0946
0,000
-0,0016 0,0923
0,000
(0,096) (0,098) (0,071) (0,108) (0,063) (0,129) (0,063)
Q
0,9695 0,9322 1,3005
0,000
0,9389 0,9724
0,435
0,8650 1,0030
0,040
(0,722) 0,708 (0,757) (0,825) (0,496) (0,906) (0,487)
Ln(TA)
6,1810 6,0844 7,0534
0,000
6,0057 6,4698
0,000
5,2792 7,0112
0,000
(0,745) (0,704) (0,498) (0,733) (0,678) (0,488) (0,387)
CR
0,0891 0,0860 0,1172
0,000
0,0720 0,0907
0,001
0,0517 0,0716
0,006
(0,109) (01,109) (0,108) (0,103) (0,105) (0,085) (0,082)
CAC
0,2506 0,2615 0,1508
0,000
0,2502 0,2194
0,001
0,3176 0,1398
0,001
(0,168) (0,171) (0,086) (0,171) (0,149) (0,194) (0,095)
continues
nefit from financial economies of scale (i.e., they have 
greater difficulties in accessing external sources of fi-
nancing). According to Fama and French (2002), becau-
se size is positively correlated with age, smaller compa-
nies are less likely to have developed histories that allow 
investors to distinguish between companies with good 
and poor abilities to pay.
 3.3  sample
The population of the present study includes all 
non-financial publicly traded Brazilian companies 
whose accounting and market information were avai-
lable in the Economática database for the 1995-2005 
period. We adjusted the data to 2005 values by using 
the General Price Index-Internal Availability (GPI-IA). 
We eliminated the observations that presented at least 
one of the following restrictions: (a) did not provide 
indebtedness in any year in the period under review; 
(b) had surplus cash reserves below R$500,000; (c) had 
annual growth in net sales or total assets that excee-
ded 100%; (d) exhibited a Q value less than 0 or greater 
than 10; and (e) had debts greater than the book value 
of the assets.
These sample restrictions have the following purposes: (a) 
and (b) serve to exclude the companies that were unable to 
adopt active cash and debt policies; (c) eliminates the compa-
nies that experienced significant changes in the fundamentals 
of their businesses; (d) mitigates the potential effects of mea-
surement errors related to the variable Q; and (e) eliminates 
the companies that could have been close to default.
 4  anaLYses oF the resuLts
The sample consisted of 1,836 observations and 326 
companies. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics 
as well as the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of 
the variables used in the estimates for the full sample 
and for the groups of constrained (C) and unconstrai-
ned (U) companies for each of the three sorting crite-
ria. It also presents the p-value (PV) of the t test for the 
mean differences (C ≠ U) of the variables between the 
groups.
In general, the independent variables mainly presen-
ted mean differences that were statistically significant at 
a 10% level, which indicates that the classification crite-
ria presented discriminating behavior for the variables 
tested. In short, the constrained companies revealed lo-
wer cash flows, lower investment opportunities, lower Ln 
(TA), lower cash reserves, less application in permanent 
assets, less debt and fewer fixed assets while presenting 
a greater balance in other liquid assets, a greater balan-
ce in internal funds and a higher debt/Eq ratio than the 
unconstrained companies. These descriptive statistics 
suggest that the theoretical profiles of the constrained 
and unconstrained companies most strongly identified 
by the debt, internal funds and cash flow variables are 
empirically valid.
This section describes the results of the empirical 
tests. Table 2 presents the results of the first test, which 
aimed to verify whether the groups’ behavior matched 
the empirical implications of Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach’s (2004) theory (i.e., constrained companies 
have a positive and statistically significant sensitivity to 
cash flow, whereas unconstrained companies demons-
trate indifferent behavior).
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Variables
Complete 
Sample
ADR PAY SIZE∩PAY
C U C ≠U C U C ≠U C U C ≠U
M/(SD) M/(SD) M/(SD) PV M/(SD) M/(SD) PV M/(SD) M/(SD) PV
PAA
0,0768 0,0725 0,1136
0,000
0,0680 0,0873
0,000
0,0483 0,0974
0,000
(0,074) (0,072) (0,081) (0,069) (0,078) (0,053) (0,079)
Debt/Eq
1,1614 1,1865 0,9349
0,173
1,5614 0,8827
0,000
1,5317 1,0602
0,000
(2,412) (2,511) (1,169) (3,148) (1,258) (3,474) (1,150)
ΔIF
0,0087 0,0074 0,0207
0,153
0,0035 -0,0017
0,464
-0,0098 0,0045
0,131
(0,114) (0,116) (0,092) (0,126) (0,096) (0,120) (0,065)
Debt
0,2482 0,2415 0,3084
0,000
0,2661 0,2419
0,014
0,2097 0,2873
0,013
(0,167) (0,168) (0,142) (0,176) (0,155) (0,171) (0,148)
Fixed Asset
0,4342 0,4265 0,5029
0,000
0,4346 0,4742
0,002
0,3746 0,5640
0,002
(0,219) (0,223) (0,167) (0,226) (0,211) (0,214) (0,200)
Descriptive statistics: mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the variables used in the estimates for the full sample and for the groups of companies classified as 
financially constrained (C) and unconstrained (U) for each of the three classification criteria. The period is 1995-2005. Variation in external financing (ΔEF) was me-
asured as the sum of ΔDEBT and NES. * DEBT was measured as the sum of short- and long-term financial indebtedness (debentures and financing). ΔDEBT was me-
asured as the short- and long-term variation in financial debt (debentures and financing). NES was measured as the changes in stockholders' equity minus retained 
profits. CF was measured as net income plus depreciation and amortization minus dividends and interest on equity capital. Q was measured as total assets – equity 
+ market value of shares / total assets. Ln (TA) was measured as the logarithm of the assets’ book value. CR was measured as the sum of cash and short-term finan-
cial investments. ΔCA-C was measured as the variation in current assets minus the variation in the cash reserve (CR). PAA was measured as the sum of permanent 
assets, including applications in affiliates and subsidiaries. DEBT/Eq was measured as the ratio of debt to equity. The variation in internal funds (ΔIF) was measured 
as the sum of the variance in the cash reserve (CR) and the change in customers and inventory. FA was measured as fixed assets. All of the variables were staggered 
by total assets, except for Q, Ln (TA) and DEBT/Eq. The p-value (PV) represents the t test for the mean differences (C ≠ U) of the variables between the groups.
Table 1 continued
 Table 2  Descriptive statistics of the sample and groups 
DV: ΔCRi,t Independent Variables Sargan C WH
Criteria Status CFi,t Qi,t Ln(TA)i,t ΔCA-Ci,t ΔSTSi,t PAAi,t
ADR
Constrained
0.6022 0.0294 -0.2878 -0.4659 0.2088 0.0356
(0.55) (0.44) (0.00)***
(0.058)* (0.090)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** 0.945
Unconstrained
0.7089 -0.0435 -0.0491 -0.0511 0.0938 0.2263
(0.55) (0.45) (0.00)***
(0.241) (0.495) (0.761) (0.016)** (0.616) (0.436)
PAY
Constrained
0.5959 0.0263 -0.0731 -0.3194 -0.0159 0.0473
(0.62) (0.31) (0.00)***
(0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.165) (0.001)*** (0.821) (0.895)
Unconstrained
0.9131 0.0090 -0.1204 -0.2824 0.4965 -0.0530
(0.31) (0.66) (0.00)***
(0.439) (0.730) (0.161) (0.023)** (0.001)*** (0.897)
SIZE∩PAY
Constrained
0.2026 0.0379 0.0039 -0.1572 0.0408 -0.194
(0.58) (0.18) (0.00)***
(0.056)* (0.067)* (0.896) (0.035)** (0.511) (0.598)
Unconstrained
5.335 -0.0897 -0.338 -0.716 -0.2122 0.764
(0.80) (0.37) (0.00)***
(0.294) (0.441) (0.291) (0.217) (0.735) (0.462)
The results of the estimates by 2SLS (fixed effects for company and year) applying Model 1 to the groups of financially constrained (C) and unconstrained (U) 
companies for each of the three classification criteria. ΔCR was measured as the change in the sum of cash and short-term investments. CF was measured 
as net income plus depreciation and amortization minus dividends and interest on equity capital. Q was measured as total assets - equity market value of 
shares / total assets. Ln (TA) was measured as the logarithm of the assets’ book value. ΔCA-C was measured as the change in current assets minus the change 
in the cash reserve (CR). ΔSTD was measured as the changes in short-term financial debt (debentures and financing). PAA was measured as the sum of per-
manent assets, including applications in affiliates and subsidiaries. All of the variables were staggered by total assets, except for Q and Ln (TA). The results 
(p-values) of the diagnostic statistics for over-identification constraints (Sargan test), exogeneity of instruments (difference in Sargan test, C) and endogeneity 
(Wu-Hausman test, WH) are also illustrated. The CF variables, Ln (TA), ΔSTD, ΔCA-C and PAA, were considered endogenous in the model and were instru-
mentalized with the first and second lags. The sample comprises the annual observations for the 1995-2005 period. Robust estimates were performed using 
the Eiker-Huber-White estimator5. The p-values are presented in parentheses.
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
5 Estimates were conducted via two-step GMM, which we proved to be robust to heteroscedasticity by using the xtivreg2, gmm2s command in the Stata/IC software 11.0, but the results proved to be qualitatively 
similar.
The estimates indicated a significant and positive sensitivity 
to cash flow for the constrained companies, whereas the un-
constrained companies showed no such statistically significant 
behavior. These results occurred regardless of the classification 
criteria and corresponded to the behavior advocated by Almei-
da, Campello and Weisbach’s (2004) theory. The estimates in-
dicate that for each Real normalized by the total assets of cash 
flow, the constrained companies used between 20 and 60 cents 
of their available internal funds (in this case, cash reserves), 
whereas the unconstrained companies do not present any such 
significant behavior. The mean of the coefficients of the cash 
flow variable in Model 1 for the constrained companies was 
0.4669, whereas in Almeida, Campello and Weisbach’s (2004) 
study, the mean coefficient was found to be 0.2873.
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 Table 3  Sensitivity of External Funds/Debt to Cash Flow
Panel A: Sensitivity Of External Funds to Cash Flow
DV: ΔExternal Funds Criteria
Independent 
Variables
Complete 
Sample
ADR PAY SIZE∩PAY
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
CFi,t
-0,2200 -0,2636 -0,4862 -0,2049 -0,6521 -0,1829 -0,9687
(0.006)*** (0.000)*** (0.027)** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.055)* (0.025)**
Qi,t
0,0068 0,0037 0,0512 0,0089 0,1036 0,0025 0,1060
(0.365) (0.684) (0.0560)* (0.481) (0.007)*** (0.910) (0.051)*
Ln(TA)i,t
0,1451 0,1509 0,2260 0,1061 0,2327 -0,0398 0,3337
(0.050)** (0.000)*** (0.012)** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.233) (0.006)***
R2 0,035 0,032 0,093 0,064 0,009 0,102 0,012
N 1836 1644 182 951 415 354 211
Painel B: Sensitivity Of Debt To Cash Flow
DV: ΔDebt Criteria
Independent 
Variables
Complete 
Sample
ADR PAY SIZE∩PAY
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
CFi,t
-0,0965 -0,0809 -0,4262 -0,0626 -0,7192 -0,1119 -0,6077
(0.020)** (0.065)* (0.034)** (0.291) (0.000)*** (0.092)* (0.015)**
Qi,t
0,0022 -0,0048 0,0639 0,0000 0,0890 -0,0108 0,0625
(0.745) (0.504) (0.018)** (0,978) (0.000)*** (0.481) (0.044)**
Ln(TA)i,t
0,0894 0,0229 0,0842 0.014** -0,0362 0,0026 -0,0111
(0.000)*** (0.087)* (0.478) (0,397) (0.455) (0.877) (0.875)
R2 0,021 0,033 0,110 0,035 0,052 0,039 0,107
N 1836 1632 182 937 420 342 211
The results of the estimates by OLS (fixed effects for company and year) using Model 2 on the groups of financially constrained (R2) and unconstrained (N) 
companies for each of the three classification criteria. Panel A presents the results of the estimates using the variation in external funds (net issuance of 
shares plus net debt issuance) as a dependent variable (DV). Panel B presents the results of the estimates using the short- and long-term annual changes in 
financial indebtedness (financing and debentures) as the DV debt variation. ΔCR was measured as the change in the sum of cash and short-term financial in-
vestments. CF was measured as net income plus depreciation and amortization minus dividends and interest on own capital. Q was measured as total assets 
- equity market value of shares / total assets. Ln (TA) was measured as the neperian logarithm of the assets’ book value. The sample comprises the annual 
observations from 1995 to 2005. Robust estimates were performed using the Eiker-Huber-White estimator. The p-values are reported in parentheses.
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
In addition, Tobin’s Q proved to be positive and signifi-
cant only for the constrained companies. This finding was 
consistent with the empirical implications of the theory, ac-
cording to which investment opportunities would be a con-
cern only for constrained companies. As a result, these com-
panies must adjust their financial policies (in this case, their 
cash policies) to avoid underinvestment.
Given the success with the measurement, the empirical 
verification and the theoretical correspondence of cash sen-
sitivity to cash flow, we were able to start the second phase of 
the empirical tests.
The second test involved estimates intended to observe 
the pecking order behavior, as commonly reported in the li-
terature, of negative and significant sensitivity between cash 
flow and debt. Equal estimates were performed to verify whe-
ther external funds (debt and equity) were negatively sensi-
tive to cash flow. Panel A in Table 3 reveals a negative and 
statistically significant sensitivity (at 1%) of external funds 
to cash flow for the complete sample. Thus, for each Real of 
internally generated funds (cash flow) normalized by assets, 
approximately 22 cents are used to reduce the demand for 
external funds. Panel B presents similar results. The results 
for the complete sample indicate a negative and significant 
sensitivity (at 5%) of debt to cash flow. This finding indicates 
that for each Real of cash flow normalized by assets, approxi-
mately 9 cents are used to reduce the demand for debt.
When the companies are separated by their financial sta-
tuses, Table 3 demonstrates that the external funds (Panel A) 
and debt (Panel B) of both the constrained and unconstrai-
ned companies show a significant and negative sensitivity 
(at 10%) to cash flow. However, the negative sensitivity of 
external funds is systematically higher for the unconstrained 
companies. For every Real normalized by the total assets of 
cash flow, the unconstrained companies use between 48 and 
96 cents to reduce the demand for external funds, where-
as the constrained companies use between 18 and 26 cents 
for this purpose. The same situation occurs with regard to 
the negative sensitivity of debt to cash flow; in this case, the 
unconstrained companies use between 42 and 61 cents to re-
duce the demand for debt, whereas the restricted companies 
use between 6 and 11 cents.
The mean of the coefficients of the cash flow variable in 
Model 2 for the sensitivity of external funds was -0.2171 for 
the constrained companies and -0.7023 for the unconstrai-
ned companies, whereas Almeida and Campello (2010) re-
ported values of -0.0202 and -0.1505, respectively.
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 Table 4  Sensitivity of External Funds to Cash Flow: Expanded Model
Criteria ADR PAY SIZE∩PAY
Independent 
Variables Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
CFi,t
-0,2518 -0,6370 -0,1684 -0,3069 -0,1810 -0,7322
(0.023)** (0.060)* (0.100)* (0.090)* (0.275) (0.218)
Qi,t
0,0001 0,0215 0,0130 0,1280 -0,0429 0,0633
(0.989) (0.535) (0.053)*** (0.000)*** (0.322) (0.072)*
Ln(TA)i,t
0,2165 0,3202 0,5444 0,5143 0,3592 0,3630
(0.0789)* (0.068)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.016)** (0.210)
ΔCR i,t-1
1,0589 -0,9550 -0,1505 -0,1915 1,5852 2,5319
(0.331) (0.525) (0.355) (0.296) (0.382) (0.203)
ΔOLA i,t-1
0,5645 -0,2226 0,2990 -0,0317 0,2719 0,6038
(0.185) (0.710) (0.0141)** (0.867) (0.162) (0.420)
FA i,t-1
0,6172 -0,2372 0,1251 -0,2507 0,2812 0,0335
(0.144) (0.563) (0.548) (0.395) (0.271) (0.036)**
Debti,t-1 / PLi,t-1
-0,0010 -0,0055 -0,0013 -0,1732 -0,0002 -0,3121
(0.013)** (0.663) (0.031)** (0.000)*** (0.922) (0.068)*
Hansen (0.610) (0.133) (0.293) (0.901) (0.232) (0.868)
N 902 128 567 236 159 110
R2 0,1705 0,1485 0,1912 0,2000 0,0909 0,2290
The results of the two-step GMM estimates (fixed effects for company and year) using Model 3 for the groups of financially constrained (R2) and uncons-
trained (N) companies for each of the three sorting criteria. The variation in External Financing (ΔEF) was measured as the sum of ΔDEBT and NES. CF was 
measured as net income plus depreciation and amortization minus dividends and interest on own capital. ΔCR was measured as the change in the sum of 
cash and short-term investments. Q was measured as total assets - equity + market value of shares / total assets. LN (TA) was measured as the logarithm of 
the assets’ book value. ΔFA was measured as the annual change in fixed assets. DEBT/Eq was measured as the ratio of DEBT to equity. All of the variables 
were staggered by total assets, except for Q, Ln (TA) and DEBT/Eq. The table also presents the p-value of Hansen's test statistic for the restrictions on iden-
tification. The sample comprises the annual observations from 1995 to 2005. Robust estimates were performed using the Eiker-Huber-White estimator. The 
p-values are reported in parentheses.
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
6 After performing the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, we adopted the proxies’ variables for tangibility and capital structure as endogenous variables by using the second and third lags as instruments.
The control variables for both Panel A and Panel B 
revealed low adherence to expectations. Investment 
opportunities presented a significant and positive re-
lationship only for the unconstrained companies. The 
company size systematically revealed statistical signi-
ficance only in Panel A, where it presented a positive 
relationship regardless of the classification criteria and 
the financial status.
Table 4 pertains to alternative specifications for the se-
cond test, where the model was estimated by GMM in two 
steps, including control variables for the sources of pre-
existing internal resources and lagged proxies for tangibi-
lity and capital structure. The estimates performed for the 
constrained and unconstrained companies in accordance 
with the three classification criteria reinforce the results 
described in Table 3.
Using the ADR and PAY classification criteria, we 
found that the external funds of the constrained compa-
nies presented a sensitivity to cash flow of between 16 and 
25 normalized cents of assets, whereas those of the uncons-
trained companies presented a negative sensitivity to cash 
flow of  between 30 and 63 cents. Using the SIZE∩PAY 
criterion, we observed no statistically significant beha-
vior, although the cash flow coefficient of the unconstrai-
ned companies was larger than that of the constrained 
companies. The Hansen test indicated that the employed 
instruments can be considered valid6. Additional control 
variables did not individualize systematic and significant 
behavior in the estimates, with the exception of the proxy 
for capital structure, which was negative in the estimates 
regardless of the companies’ financial states.
The average of the coefficients of the cash flow variable 
in Model 3 for the sensitivity of capital was -0.2004 for the 
constrained companies and -0.5587 for the unconstrained 
companies, whereas Almeida and Campello (2010) repor-
ted values of -0.0194 and -0.1602, respectively.
The results of the second test showed agreement with 
the results of past Brazilian empirical studies (Bastos, 
Nakamura and Basso, 2009; Medeiros and Daher, 2008; 
Nakamura et al., 2007), which associate the negative re-
lationship between the generation of internal funds and 
the demand for external funds/debt with the Pecking 
Order Theory.
In general, the results of the second test suggest that 
the negative relationship between internal and external 
financing is more intense for the unconstrained compa-
nies that are less likely to be subject to higher financing 
costs. The constrained companies showed a smaller nega-
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 Table 5  Financial Constraints and the Sensitivity of Internal/External Funds (Debt) to Cash Flow 
Constrained
Variáveis Independentes R2 N
Criteria Dependent Variable
CFi,t (P-value) Qi,t (P-value) Ln(TA)i,t (P-value)
Panel A
ADR
ΔInternal Funds 0,2998 (0,00)*** 0,0129 (0,00)*** 0,0051 (0,30) 0,183
1515
ΔExternal Funds -0,1506 (0,00)*** 0,0164 (0,00)*** 0,0111 (0,04)** 0,200
PAY
ΔInternal Funds 0,3473 (0,00)*** 0,0217 (0,00)*** 0,006 (0,37)*** 0,223
870
ΔExternal Funds -0,1852 (0,00)*** 0,033 (0,00)*** 0,0174 (0,03)** 0,228
SIZE∩PAY
ΔInternal Funds 0,3296 (0,00)*** -0,0079 (0,48) 0,0168 (0,25) 0,345
327
ΔExternal Funds -0,1165 (0,04) ** 0,0248 (0,08) * 0,0218 (0,24) 0,287
continues
tive relationship, which indicates that this relationship was 
mitigated. This behavior is systematic and incompatible 
with the explanation of the pecking order standard for the 
substitutivity between internal and external funds, which 
is based precisely on the cost of external financing. As dis-
cussed earlier, the investment endogeneity induced by the 
financial constraints most likely explains the greater com-
plementarity between external and internal funds in the 
constrained companies.
Thus, in the third test, we sought to verify whether the 
complementarity between internal and external funds was 
greater for the constrained companies than for the un-
constrained companies. The empirical implication is as-
sociated with the argument that investment decisions and 
financing are determined simultaneously. Additionally, it 
is associated with the credit multiplier effect that occurs if 
constrained companies manage their internal funds to in-
crease their abilities to raise external funds. We expected 
the constrained companies’ external and internal funds to 
present a minor negative sensitivity and a higher positive 
sensitivity to cash flow, respectively, in comparison with 
the unrestricted companies.
Table 5 presents the results estimated by seemingly un-
related regression (SUR) equations with fixed effects for 
company and year. These estimations used Models 4 and 
5 on the groups of financially constrained and unconstrai-
ned companies for each of the three classification criteria. 
The SUR estimation allowed us to capture simultaneous 
behavior arising from each company’s policies. The obser-
ved effect contrasts the sensitivity of the constrained and 
unconstrained companies’ internal and external funds to 
their cash flows.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the internal funds of cons-
trained companies systematically present a positive sensi-
tivity to cash flow. At the same time, the panel highlights 
the negative sensitivity of external funds to cash flow. Pa-
nel B shows that the internal funds of the unconstrained 
companies do not show a significant and systematic sen-
sitivity to cash flow. Rather, their external funds exhibit a 
systematic, significant negative sensitivity to cash flow. Pa-
nel C indicates that the internal funds of the constrained 
companies systematically present a positive sensitivity to 
cash flow. However, their debt presents a non-significant 
negative sensitivity to cash flow. Panel D shows that the in-
ternal funds of the unconstrained companies do not reveal 
a significant, systematic sensitivity to cash flow. However, 
their debt demonstrates a systematic, significant negative 
sensitivity to cash flow.
The sensitivity of external funds to cash flow was syste-
matically more negative for the financially unconstrained 
companies than for the financially constrained companies. 
In general, the results for the third test, which are reported 
in Table 5, support Almeida and Campello’s (2010) hypo-
thesis that the complementarity between internal funds 
and external funds is greater for constrained companies 
than for unconstrained companies because of the endoge-
neity of investment decisions, which contradicts the substi-
tutivity between internal and external funds implied by the 
Pecking Order Theory.
We found that the mean of the coefficients of the cash 
flow variable for the sensitivity of internal funds in Model 
4 was 0.3268 for the constrained companies, whereas Al-
meida and Campello (2010) reported a value of 0.0547. Si-
milarly, we found that the average of the coefficients of the 
cash flow variable in Model 5 for the sensitivity of exter-
nal funds was -0.0422 for the constrained companies and 
-0.2610 for the unconstrained companies. In comparison, 
Almeida and Campello (2010) reported values of -0.0128 
and -0.1545, respectively.
By comparing the mean of the coefficients of the pre-
sent study for both constrained and unconstrained compa-
nies with the findings of Almeida and Campello (2010), we 
can observe that the positive sensitivity of internal funds to 
cash flow is systematically greater in the sample of Brazi-
lian constrained companies than in the sample of Ameri-
can constrained companies.
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Constrained
Variáveis Independentes R2 N
Criteria Dependent Variables
CFi,t (P-value) Qi,t (P-value) Ln(TA)i,t (P-value)
Panel C
ADR
ΔInternal Funds 0,3041 (0,00)*** 0,0137 (0,00)*** 0,0060 (0,24) 0,186
1458
ΔDebt -0,0504 (0,10) -0,0071 (0,15) 0,0177 (0,00)*** 0,118
PAY
ΔInternal Funds 0,3472 (0,00)*** 0,0218 (0,00)*** 0,0061 (0,37) 0,230
873
ΔDebt -0,0575 (0,14) -0,0100 (0,14) 0,0190 (0,00)*** 0,126
SIZE∩PAY
ΔInternal Funds 0,3292 (0,00)*** -0,0079 (0,48) 0,0170 (0,24) 0,345
328
ΔDebt -0,0188 (0,69) -0,0161 (0,18) -0,0091 (0,56) 0,235
Unconstrained
Variáveis Independentes R2 N
Criteria Dependent Variables
CFi,t (P-value) Qi,t (P-value) Ln(TA)i,t (P-value)
Panel B
ADR
ΔInternal Funds 0,027 (0,85) 0,0298 (0,10)* -0,0459 (0,47) 0,282
166
ΔExternal Funds -0,4688 (0,01)** 0,0474 (0,04)** 0,2262 (0,00)*** 0,439
PAY
ΔInternal Funds -0,0271 (0,77) 0,0188 (0,11) 0,0111 (0,16) 0,218
382
ΔExternal Funds -0,1976 (0,05)* 0,0539 (0,00)*** 0,0101 (0,25) 0,392
SIZE∩PAY
ΔInternal Funds -0,2084 (0,03)** 0,0172 (0,21) 0,0238 (0,11) 0,207
190
ΔExternal Funds -0,187 (0,23) 0,0741 (0,00)*** 0,0328 (0,16) 0,384
Unconstrained
Variáveis Independentes R2 N
Criteria Dependent Variables
CFi,t (P-value) Qi,t (P-value) Ln(TA)i,t (P-value)
Panel D
ADR
ΔInternal Funds -0,0405 (0,78) 0,0285 (0,11) -0,0417 (0,51) 0,298
166
ΔDebt -0,2705 (0,14) 0,0651 (0,00)*** 0,1554 (0,05)** 0,278
PAY
ΔInternal Funds -0,0198 (0,83) 0,0188 (0,11) 0,0110 (0,17) 0,223
389
ΔDebt -0,2988 (0,00)*** 0,0411 (0,00)*** 0,0050 (0,50) 0,356
SIZE∩PAY
ΔInternal Funds -0,2084 (0,03)** 0,0172 (0,21) 0,0238 (0,10) 0,217
191
ΔDebt -0,2136 (0,08)* 0,0480 (0,00)*** 0,0200 (0,27) 0,340
The results of the SUR estimates (fixed effects for company and year) using Models 4 and 5 in the groups of financially constrained (Panels A and C) and 
unconstrained companies (Panels B and D) for each of the three classification criteria. Panels A and B present the results of the estimates for the sensitivity 
of external funds to cash flow, whereas panels C and D present the results of the estimates for the sensitivity of debt to cash flow. ΔDEBT was measured as 
the short- and long-term changes in financial debt (debentures and financing). The variation in internal funds (ΔIF) was measured as the sum of the annual 
variation in the cash reserve (ΔCR) and the variation in the other net assets (ΔOLA). Cash flow (CF) was measured as net income plus depreciation and amor-
tization minus dividends and interest on own capital. Investment opportunities (Q) were measured as total assets - equity + market value of shares / total 
assets. Size (Ln (TA)) was measured as the logarithm of the assets’ book value. All of the variables were staggered by total assets, except for Q and Ln (TA). 
The sample comprises the annual observations from 1995 to 2005. Robust estimates were performed using the Eiker-Huber-White estimator. The p-values 
are reported in parentheses.
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
Table 5 continued
Similarly, we noted that the external funds and debt 
of the constrained and unconstrained Brazilian compa-
nies systematically present greater negative sensitivity 
to cash flow than those of their US peers. This finding 
reinforces Khurana, Martin and Pereira’s (2006) and 
Baum, Schäfer and Talavera’s (2009) hypotheses that the 
internal funds of companies subject to less developed 
financial environments are prone to displaying greater 
positive sensitivity to cash flow because of the degree of 
financial development and the characteristics of the fi-
nancial architecture (in terms of the companies’ capabi-
lities to access external funds).
 5  FInaL consIderatIons
The present study aimed to test the empirical im-
plications suggested by Almeida and Campello (2010) 
in Brazilian companies with respect to the effects of 
financial constraint and the resulting endogeneity of 
corporate investment in the light of the Pecking Or-
der Theory’s implications for the substitutivity between 
external and internal funds (i.e., this substitutivity is 
empirically linked to the negative relationship between 
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cash flow and external funds). These authors suggest 
that if this negative relationship is larger in unconstrai-
ned than in constrained companies, it cannot be asso-
ciated with the presence of costly external funds and 
cannot therefore be interpreted as evidence of behavior 
in accordance with the Pecking Order Theory.
The results from this study reveal that the sensitivi-
ty of external funds to cash flow is negative and statis-
tically significant for the subsamples of both uncons-
trained and constrained companies. Additional results 
show that the external funds of the constrained com-
panies present lower sensitivity to cash flow than those 
of the unconstrained companies. Finally, the internal 
funds of the constrained companies show a positive 
sensitivity to cash flow, whereas those of the uncons-
trained companies do not suggest significant and sys-
tematic behavior. The results were not susceptible to 
the econometric specifications and to the classification 
criteria.
These findings also maintain correspondence with 
the study of Almeida and Campello (2010). Thus, we 
can state that in companies subject to high external fi-
nancing costs (constrained companies), the endogenei-
ty of the investment makes internal and external funds 
more complementary than substitutive. This finding 
reasonably explains the behavior not explained by the 
Pecking Order Theory.
The present study also maintains theoretical corres-
pondence with Khurana, Martin and Pereira’s (2006) 
and Baum, Schäfer and Talavera’s (2009) hypotheses 
that the positive sensitivity of internal funds to cash 
flow is conditioned by the financial system’s structure 
and degree of development. The results of this study 
show that financial policies are more sensitive to cash 
flow among Brazilian companies than among US com-
panies. This conclusion suggests that Brazilian compa-
nies invest greater effort into adjusting their financial 
policies to reduce the possibility of underinvestment.
This study helps to address the gap between capital 
structure theories and the behavior commonly repor-
ted in the literature as associated with the Pecking Or-
der Theory and as contrary to the static trade-off the-
ory: the negative relationship between cash flow and 
external funds. The fact that this study corroborates 
the evidence of Almeida and Campello (2010) indicates 
the explanatory inadequacy of these theories. The gap 
is addressed when the dynamic trade-off emerges as a 
theory with explanatory power regarding the behavior 
addressed in this study.
The dynamic trade-off theory explains how a nega-
tive relationship occurs between internal and external 
funds in unconstrained companies when, according to 
the arguments of Modigliani and Miller (1958), they 
should present indefinite behavior. According to the 
theory, the adjustment costs of capital structure can 
cause companies behaving optimally to not adjust their 
capital structures (i.e., maintain low debt levels) if the 
costs of adjusting the level of debt exceed the costs of 
maintaining a sub-optimal capital structure (Hennessy 
and Whited, 2005). In this direction, Strebulaev (2007) 
suggests that companies do not adjust their capital 
structures frequently because of market frictions.
In Brazil, studies involving dynamic trade-off are 
still incipient, but a few studies, such as those of Rocha 
and Amaral (2007) and Machado and Maia (2009), have 
presented evidence of the importance of adjustment 
costs in determining the capital structure. Similarly, no 
known studies in Brazil have explored the joint interac-
tion between investments and funding decisions while 
considering the dynamic trade-off theoretical approach 
in an underinvestment risk context in the same manner 
as the international studies of Hennessy and Whited 
(2005) and Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009). This 
study helps to fill this gap in the national literature.
Therefore, the present study contributes to the na-
tional literature on financial restrictions and capital 
structures. For analyses of financial constraints, this 
study contributes by successfully applying classification 
criteria concerning the degree of financial constraints 
to companies. Brazilian studies have found difficul-
ties in establishing consistent classification criteria a 
priori concerning the degree of financial constraints to 
companies (Aldrighi and Bisinha, 2010; Costa and Paz, 
2004; Hamburger, 2004; Zani and Procianoy, 2005).
The present study also contributes to the unders-
tanding of how corporate and environmental charac-
teristics affect companies’ capabilities to meet their 
investment opportunities fully. In fact, the presence 
of financial frictions not only affects the real economy 
by quantitatively reducing investments but also chan-
ges the qualitative aspects of the investments (Almei-
da, Campello and Weisbach, 2011; Crisóstomo, 2009) 
if constrained companies prioritize investments with 
better payback and with the ability to generate colla-
teral. Therefore, understanding corporate behavior 
in the face of financial frictions allows us to estimate 
more accurately the level and profile of the investments 
made by companies in the economy.
As a result, the present study contributes to a better 
understanding of how companies anticipate financial 
frictions by adjusting their financial policies (e.g., cash, 
debt, hedges and dividends). In turn, this improved 
knowledge allows for greater predictive capacity in mo-
dels of corporate financial behavior. Likewise, it allo-
ws policymakers to develop institutional and financial 
instruments that make it possible to reduce the nega-
tive externalities of financial constraints. An example 
of such an instrument comes from one of the basic as-
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